

DOD Wireless Policies and Requirements

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Policies DOD Deals With

- ♦ Global Information Grid Policy (Wired and Wireless)
- ♦ DOD Overarching Wireless Policy
- Pentagon Area Common Information Technology Wireless Security Policy
- ◆ FCC Policy
- Coalition Partner Country Policies



GIG Policy

- Not specific to wireless, but specific about Information Technology and Protection
- Carries the weight of law
- Gives specific roles to different DOD Agencies
- Brought DOD more in line with Intelligence Community and NSTISSP 11



DOD Overarching Wireless Policy

- Written for the Designated Approval Authority (poor guy who has to worry about all these wireless products)
- Written for DAA who didn't even know that he was buying a wireless product
 - -802.11
 - Bluetooth
 - IR
- ♦ In Review (SD-106) again



Classified? That's Easy!

- ◆ SECRET and TOP SECRET data must be protected with a Type I algorithm
 - BATON
 - AES (sufficient key length)
 - SKIPJACK
- Must be NSA approved / certified



Type I Product





Certification Isn't Easy

National Security Agency



Information Assurance Directorate Certificate

This certificate validation that the SecNes-11TM Segmen Wiseless Local Artia Network Personal Commissional Monocry Coal International Association (PCMCIA) mediuments proceeded security functional and ensurance requirements for unescape coeff-functionity, data integrity, and network substitution protection for the wireless path up to seel including IESAET, when represent in nonelesson with the society discrete certified. Therein, Operational Decition for the SecNes, 11TM possible wireless community for some a terminal and an acrea point, or a part terminal.

PSA does not realize, by virtue of this validation, my elementer or other representation regarding for applicability or effectiveness of the SacNa-1.1¹⁰⁰ within a total information represent accurate. The SacNa-1.1¹⁰⁰ may be that one of the reservoirs, a complementary security components needed in a security usin to precife adequate prescribes to us information system. SETSETI creditation of the SetPeri-11¹⁰⁰ read in a solicular part to system confidentiate, but not a substitute for Enal system certification and accordination by the Local Designated Approximg Antisony (DAA). Society compount scientists enable to the does in that system common employing at Information Systems Sensin's Engineering process. The software common ordinates on the compute this disposit with the SacNat-1.1¹⁰⁰ is to be considered, along with any other systems handware/offware, as part of the system that Incorporates the SecNat-1.1¹⁰¹



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SBU, FOUO? OOOOOH....

- ♦ What are you trying to protect?
 - Personnel Data
 - Logistics
 - Medical
 - Financial
- ♦ Who are you trying to protect it from
 - Hackers
 - Enemies



Better to Light a Candle...

- ♦ FIPS 140-1 or 2 MUST be used
- ◆ VPN? Traffic Protection?
- Accounting for products
- ♦ Unclassified in total?



Pentagon Wireless Policy

- Pentagon and any network that is interdependent of a Pentagon Network
- Moratorium placed on new wireless products
- NSA to produce a database for wireless vulnerabilities



Pentagon Wireless Policy (cont.)

- Does not apply to SCIFs (covered under DCID policy already)
- ♦ No connectivity to Classified networks



FCC

- Still beholdin' to FCC
 - Can request waivers, and usually get them, but we have to coexist
- ♦ Must maintain separate rules for Wireless Products (WLANs are Class 3, Microwave lights are class 2....)
- Often neglected in the coverage maps of wireless products



Coalition Compliance

- Special Products may not be usable in foreign countries
 - Not just frequency
 - By design
 - By accident
- Products may have to be approved
 - Result could be confiscation of platform



Homeland Security

- Coalition Partners we never imagined
 - First Responders
 - ONS
 - Coast Guard
 - DOJ, DOT, DOS, DOWhatever
- ♦ Need to have a single, <u>trusted</u> thread from beginning to end



Brave New Government

- Much like the old Soviet model (but arrived at completely differently)
- Dependence on partners, vendors, local law enforcement
- ♦ Institutional awareness of vulnerabilities
- New emphasis on security
- Must keep pace with technology